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ABSTRACT: This work introduces novel methods for conducting forensic analysis of file allocation traces, collectively called digital stratig-
raphy. These in-depth forensic analysis methods can provide insight into the origin, composition, distribution, and time frame of strata within
storage media. Using case examples and empirical studies, this paper illuminates the successes, challenges, and limitations of digital stratigra-
phy. This study also shows how understanding file allocation methods can provide insight into concealment activities and how real-world com-
puter usage can complicate digital stratigraphy. Furthermore, this work explains how forensic analysts have misinterpreted traces of normal file
system behavior as indications of concealment activities. This work raises awareness of the value of taking the overall context into account
when analyzing file system traces. This work calls for further research in this area and for forensic tools to provide necessary information for
such contextual analysis, such as highlighting mass deletion, mass copying, and potential backdating.
KEYWORDS: forensic science, digital forensics, digital evidence, digital stratigraphy, contextual forensic analysis, file system analysis, file
allocation strategies, next-available file allocation, best-fit file allocation, valid data length slack, file initialization, file tunneling
When computing devices are used to create, alter, and destroy
or conceal data by deleting, reformatting, wiping, or backdating
files, it might be possible to determine the sequence of associ-
ated events using digital traces, even when the original file con-
tents are not recoverable. Specifically, it can be useful to
perform a type of contextual analysis using knowledge of file
systems and nuances of allocation mechanisms. This work intro-
duces novel approaches to contextual analysis of file allocation
traces, collectively referred to here as digital stratigraphy
because it has similarities with stratigraphy performed in geology
and archeology.
Stratigraphy is the scientific study of layers (a.k.a. strata) with
the aim of determining the origin, composition, distribution, and
time frame of each stratum (1) Stratigraphic analysis is one of
the cornerstones of archeology. Recent advances in digital foren-
sic analysis have concentrated on temporal analysis (2–4). Prior
to the present work, digital stratigraphy has not been systemati-
cally defined and applied in forensic science (5). Without these
in-depth analysis methods, valuable clues remain buried within
storage media.
Such contextual, stratigraphic analysis is particularly useful in
digital forensic science when data were intentionally destroyed
or falsified (e.g., backdating a document). When the creation
time of a document is at issue, an examination of how data are
positioned and overlaid on the disk might give a sense of when
the document was created. Under certain conditions, it is possi-
ble to infer when deletion occurred on the basis of file allocation
activities and significant gaps, even when the deleted files and
their metadata are not recoverable. However, in some situations,
it can be challenging to distinguish between concealment behav-
ior versus normal system activity such as file initialization and
file tunneling. Forensic analysts must be able to recognize such
peculiarities in file allocation to avoid incorrect conclusions
about digital stratigraphy.
This paper formalizes digital stratigraphy as a form of forensic
analysis and provides illustrative case examples and empirical
studies. Capabilities and challenges associated with digital
stratigraphy are covered. File allocation operations that can con-
fuse even experienced forensic analysts are explained. Potential
areas of future research are proposed.
The novel contributions of this work are as follows:
• establish digital stratigraphy as a forensic analysis method;
• demonstrate that forensic analysis can reach verifiable conclu-
sions about data destruction even when file contents or meta-
data are unrecoverable; and
• define requirements for digital forensic tools to support digi-
tal stratigraphy.
Furthermore, this work strengthens understanding of file sys-
tem behavior, thus reducing the risk that forensic analysts will
misinterpret file system traces.
File Allocation Strategies
Digital stratigraphy involves contextual analysis of how data
are arranged on storage media. The arrangement of data on stor-
age media is heavily dependent on file system allocation strate-
gies. A potential misconception of forensic analysts is that new
files are always saved onto storage media in an orderly fashion,
using the next-available location (6). In fact, under controlled
conditions, many operating systems save new files in the next-
available unoccupied area on a hard drive. However, when oper-
ating systems are performing multiple simultaneous tasks, files
may not be saved in a linear, contiguous sequence on the hard
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drive. Furthermore, there are some peculiarities and nuances in
particular file systems that generate traces that can be misinter-
preted. Before assuming next-available allocation strategy, it is
important to take into consideration the specific context of the
digital device and surrounding activities.
Next-available File Allocation
In the simplest scenarios, such as on a memory card in a digital
camera, when files are saved in quick succession, there can be an
orderly next-available allocation. In reference to FAT 16 file sys-
tems on earlier versions of Windows, including Windows 2000,
Microsoft documentation states that “In a FAT folder structure,
files are given the first available location on the volume” (7).
Source code available on Microsoft’s Web site provides insight
into the FAT file system, including a next-available allocation
strategy (8). This allocation strategy is also encountered on Linux-
based devices that use FAT file systems such as GPS devices (9).
Such an orderly allocation strategy can allow recovery of
deleted data even when the link between the deleted data and
the corresponding file system entry is lost. For instance, Fig. 1
shows files salvaged from a digital video recorder that was refor-
matted. The reformatting operation obliterated all prior FAT32
file system metadata, including the file name, file size, 1st clus-
ter, and created time of each video. However, because this
device saved files using a next-available allocation strategy, each
file ends where the next file begins. Employing content carving
techniques to search for the AVI (RIFF) header at the start of
each video successfully salvages the complete contents of every
file on the device. In addition, the sequential order of these files
indicates the order in which they were recorded on the device.
However, as noted in the following quote, the next-available
allocation strategy does not always hold true, even on FAT file
systems.
I tested Windows 98 and Windows XP systems, and it
appeared that a next available algorithm was being used in
both. The next-available algorithm searches for the first
available cluster starting from the previously allocated clus-
ter. For example, if cluster 65 is allocated to a new file and
then cluster 62 is unallocated, the next search will start at
cluster 66 and will not immediately reallocate cluster 62. . .
There are many factors that could affect the allocation of
clusters, and it is difficult to identify the exact algorithm
used.(10)
There are situations that will cause file allocation to deviate
from such a deterministic, predictable next-available allocation
strategy (11).
Case example: Windows NT was used to save Microsoft
Word documents onto a FAT formatted floppy diskette.
Forensic analysis revealed that the documents were sepa-
rated on the disk by areas filled with zeroes. One forensic
analyst assumed a next-available allocation strategy, and
misinterpreted these areas of zeroes as evidence of file wip-
ing. However, experiments performed using a Windows NT
system and the same version of Microsoft Word revealed
FIG. 1––Video files salvaged from a reformatted digital video recorder using content carving techniques. Because this device used a next-available allocation
strategy, each file ends where the next file begins, aiding recovery and indicating creation sequence. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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that normal file allocation left similar areas of zeroes
between files (12). This file allocation behaviour could be
due to new files being saved on cylinder boundaries.
In more recent operating systems, deviations from this strat-
egy on FAT file systems appear to be caused by circumstances
and usage of the storage media rather than any complexity in
the allocation algorithm. Memory cards that were used in differ-
ent digital cameras and mobile devices were analyzed in this
study. For example, Fig 2. depicts files that were created on
two FAT16 formatted media cards used in digital cameras.
Depicted in Fig. 2 (left), photographs were taken without any
deletion. Depicted in Fig. 2 (right), a series of photographs were
taken and then deleted, then a second series of photographs
were taken and subsequently deleted, and finally some addi-
tional photographs were taken. Each file is represented as a dot
on the chart, with a line between sequential files to show the
progression over time. The x-axis shows the created time of
each file, and y-axis shows the physical location of the first
cluster of each file. Similarly, Fig. 3 plots the chronological pro-
gression and corresponding physical locations of files saved on
two FAT32 formatted media cards used in digital cameras.
These graphs were generated by opening the storage media in a
digital forensic tool (XWays Forensics) and exporting all reco-
verable file system metadata, including the created time and the
physical location of the first cluster of each file. Both Figs 2
and 3 show that files being created over time are saved in stea-
dily increasing clusters, with sudden drops when photographs
are deleted from the device.
Removable storage media used in mobile devices typically
store data from a range of applications and user activities, result-
ing in less orderly allocation of files. To observe file system
activities in real-world contexts, six SDCards used in mobile
devices were examined. The next-available allocation strategy
can still be observed on FAT16 and FAT32 formatted SDCards
that were used in mobile devices as shown in Figs 4 and 5.
FIG. 2––Plot of physical locations of files (first cluster on the y-axis) over time (created timestamps on the x-axis) from two FAT32 formatted SDCards used
in digital cameras: (left) Canon Powershot ELPH 100 HS and (right) a Nikon D70s on the right. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIG. 3––Plot of physical locations of files (first cluster on the y-axis) over time (created timestamps on the x-axis) from two FAT32 formatted SDCards used
in digital cameras: (left) Canon Powershot SD1200 IS and (right) Nikon COOLPIX S600. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIG. 4––Plot of physical locations of files (first cluster on the y-axis) over time (created timestamps on the x-axis) from FAT16 formatted SDCards in mobile
devices. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIG. 5––Plot of physical locations of files (first cluster on the y-axis) over time (created timestamps on the x-axis) from FAT32 formatted SDCards used in
Android mobile devices, showing upward trends in allocation with some significant drops. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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When such an allocation pattern is in operation and a group
of files are deleted, this can leave a gap that is discernible using
forensic analysis.
Case example: In one matter involving alleged mass dele-
tion, files had originally been copied onto the Windows
system in bulk. These files were copied onto a FAT file
system which used a next-available allocation pattern with
the physical location on the hard drive increasing linearly
over time. When the physical location of files that remained
on the hard drive was plotted over time, there were signifi-
cant gaps between these files. Even though file system
metadata for the deleted files was not recoverable, contex-
tual analysis of these gaps provided high strength of evi-
dence apropos the claim that mass deletion had occurred,
and low strength of evidence apropos the claim that mass
deletion had not occurred.
The next-available allocation strategy of FAT file systems
becomes less pronounced when files are regularly deleted from
storage media or on system drives that have experienced regular
reboots and user activities over an extended period of time.
However, on such file systems, the next-available allocation
strategy might still be discernible over narrow time periods, par-
ticularly when large amounts of data are deleted. In one matter,
the file system allocation over 1-week time told a compelling
story of mass deletion (significant drop in the physical location
of created files), followed by a period of new files being saved
onto the hard drive (linear increase in physical location over
time), followed by reformatting (another significant drop).
Although usage of a file system over time can complicate the
arrangement of files on storage media, it can also create opportu-
nities for forensic analysis. For instance, creation of temporary
files when editing a document can leave traces that reveal the
chronology of these activities. In addition, use of disk fragmen-
tation programs can group files together at a distinct point in
time. In some cases, files that are found outside of this orderly
grouping can be shown to have been saved to disk after the disk
defragmentation occurred.
Case example: Disk defragmentation processes are com-
monly used to rearrange files on a hard drive for
performance purposes. In one case of backdating, a ques-
tioned document could be shown to be backdated because
it was saved onto the hard drive after the defragmentation
process was run, on a date after the claimed creation date
of the document.(13)
Another circumstance that can complicate forensic analysis on
FAT file systems is when storage media is nearly full. In this
scenario, file allocation cannot find enough storage space in
higher numbered clusters and wraps around to the beginning of
the disk to continue its search for next-available clusters (14).
Best-fit Versus Next-available File Allocation
Unlike FAT file systems, NTFS exhibits a best-fit strategy to
allocated files, as described in Carrier.
The best-fit algorithm is when the data [are] placed in a
location that will most efficiently use the available space,
even if it is not the first or next-available. Therefore, if a
small amount of data [are] being written, it will be placed
in the clusters that are part of a small group of unallocated
clusters instead of in a large group where larger files could
be stored.(10)
Although NTFS file allocation is more sophisticated than
FAT, a predictable increase can still occur under certain circum-
stances. For example, a backup storage device on which files are
saved and rarely deleted will still exhibit the gradual increase in
file allocation location as shown in Fig. 6.
However, NTFS file systems that are actively used do not
follow such predictable allocation patterns because NTFS is
designed to make efficient use of storage space. In fact, NTFS
sometimes goes “backwards” when saving fragments of a file,
allocating later pieces of a file in lower numbered sectors
(Fig. 7). Although not easily replicated in a controlled manner,
this allocation pattern occurs during normal use of a com-
puter.
To perform digital stratigraphy and analyze deletion activities,
forensic analysts and tool developers need a strong understand-
ing of file allocation strategies. Understanding file allocation
methods can provide insight into such concealment behavior, but
FIG. 6––NTFS formatted storage media used for system backups shows increasing allocation locations over time. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonline-
library.com]
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real-world computer use introduces complexity that complicates
forensic analysis. Each file system tells a story about the use of
that storage media, and analyzing the allocation of files over
time can sometimes provide insight into deletion or other con-
cealment activities. As a result, general understanding of file
allocation methods can only be used as a starting point, and it is
necessary to take the overall context into account when analyz-
ing traces of such concealment behavior.
It is important to note that not all digital forensic tools provide
access to the file system details necessary to perform digital
stratigraphy. Forensic analysts must use tools that are fit for this
purpose, and developers can enhance digital forensic tools fea-
tures that enable digital stratigraphy. In addition, when perform-
ing digital stratigraphy, it is important to consider peculiarities
of file allocation that can create confusion: file initialization and
file tunneling.
File Initialization
When Microsoft Windows is preparing to create a new file, a
file system entry is created before any data are written to disk.
In other words, a file system entry is created and disk space is
reserved before the file contents are saved to disk. This process
is called file initialization (15). Under certain circumstances, the
storage space reserved for the new file may not be used in its
entirety or at all. Cases involving the download of many large
files from the Internet (e.g., pirated movies or software) often
include interrupted downloads, resulting in incomplete files that
occupy only part of the disk space that was originally initialized
and reserved for the file. The portion of the initialized space that
is actually used to store the new file contents is called the valid
data length (VDL) (see Fig. 8).
Forensic analysts can expect to encounter initialized, incom-
plete files on both NTFS and FAT file systems. NTFS captures
the difference between logical file size and valid data length in
two MFT fields; this difference is called VDL slack (15,16).
FAT file systems do not have fields to capture the difference
between logical file size and valid data length, making it more
difficult to detect when VDL slack is present.
From a forensic analysis perspective, VDL slack can be bene-
ficial because it can contain remnants of deleted data. VDL slack
is similar in concept to file slack except that it is contained
within the logical file size (see Fig. 8). Unlike file slack which
is no longer associated with a file, data in VDL slack are in a
kind of limbo, trapped at the end of an allocated file but not
actually part of that file, effectively freezing deleted data within
allocated files. Although various disk cleaning utilities can be
configured to wipe file slack, they generally do not reach data in
VDL slack. For example, the Eraser (version 6.2) and CCleaner
(version 5.22) disk cleaning utilities have an option to wipe file
slack (a.k.a. cluster tips), but not VDL slack. As a result, deleted
data can remain in VDL slack indefinitely, even surviving after
data destruction methods and tools have been used.
From a digital stratigraphy perspective, the data in VDL slack
existed on the computing device before the containing file. For
example, Fig. 9 shows a file that has an initialized size of
1,744,830,464 but a valid data length of 1,073,741,824 bytes
(displayed at bottom right). So, this file has 671,088,640 bytes
(640 MB) of VDL slack, which contains various fragments of
deleted data that existed on the disk before this initialized,
incomplete file was created. Extracting and searching this
640 MB of VDL slack for characteristics of common file types
found portions of deleted pictures, audio, and Web-related traces
completely unrelated to the new initialized, incomplete file.
When a file is initialized but the associated content was not
saved to disk, the new (initialized) file system entry may point
to a cluster that contains old data. This temporal discrepancy
makes analysis of digital stratigraphy more difficult and can be
misinterpreted as backdating, particularly when it is unclear
whether VDL slack is present.
Case example: A dispute over ownership of a company
hinged on the date that shares were transferred. Forensic
analysis of FAT formatted floppy disks found a series of
deleted digitized facsimiles (fax) of share transfer agree-
ments. Each fax had the date of transmission imprinted at
the top of the page. Forensic analysis also found an unre-
lated deleted file system entries (“NEWFILES”) pointing to
the same cluster that contained the deleted faxes. The NEW-
FILES had created dates that were after the transmission
dates marked at the top of the faxes. Forensic analysts were
FIG. 7––Start clusters of five parts of a single file on NTFS shown using EnCase 8. The last two parts of the file were saved in lower number clusters than
earlier parts of the file. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIG. 8––Diagram of file with a logical size that is larger than its valid
data length, leaving uninitialized space. [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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asked to weigh the two possibilities: (1) had the NEW-
FILES been overwritten by backdated faxes, or (2) had the
NEWFILES been initialized but not saved, leaving the legit-
imate faxes in the cluster. It was not possible to prove that
the NEWFILES were partially initialized because FAT file
systems do not have fields to distinguish VDL. Ultimately,
the judges decided that forensic analysis was “not conclu-
sive of the issue of when the documents stored on the
floppy disks were created or otherwise accessed.”(12)
This situation can arise on NTFS as well. For instance, the
first two files listed in Fig. 10 are partially initialized files on an
NTFS file system. The first file (MVI_6420.AVI) is easily
detected as an initialized, incomplete file because its logical size
is larger than its valid data length. The second file
(MVI_6362.AVI) appears to be zero bytes in size, but this is
erroneous information due to an interruption before the file sys-
tem entry was completed (partial initialization). In such situa-
tions, it can be difficult to ascertain whether the file was
partially initialized. Even when such a partially initialized file is
detected, it can be difficult to determine the provenance of the
cluster contents. Did the cluster contents belong to a previously
deleted file, to the new (partially initialized) file, or to an inten-
tionally backdated file?
The challenges associated with analyzing initialized, incom-
plete files and partially initialized files can be more complicated
with forensic tools that display zeroes instead of the actual disk
contents as shown in Fig. 11. This zeroing of data occurs when
the Microsoft operating system is relied on to read cluster con-
tents. As explained in Microsoft’s fsutil documentation “Any
reads between VDL and EOF automatically return 0 in order to
preserve the C2 object reuse requirement” (17). Forensic analysts
FIG. 9––File with 400MB of VDL slack viewed using XWays Forensics 18. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIG. 10––Two files that are partially initialized on NTFS shown in XWays Forensics 18. The first file (MVI_6420.AVI) is detected as partially initialized
because its logical size is larger than its valid data length. The second file (MVI_6362.AVI) is not detected as initialized because no file size information is
available. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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must be aware of such features in digital forensic software in
order to obtain information needed for digital stratigraphy.
Given the challenges of forensic analysis when file initializa-
tion is involved, great care must be taken when reaching conclu-
sions about the provenance of deleted information that is
recovered from partially initialized files.
File Tunneling
When Microsoft Windows creates a new file that has the
same name as a recently deleted file, the file system metadata
from the old, deleted file is reassigned to the new file (18).
This phenomenon is called file tunneling and can be replicated
reliably on all versions of Windows, including Windows 10.
File tunneling can result in newer content being stored in what
appears to be an older file, which can be misinterpreted as
backdating.
Case example: While providing expertise in a contract dis-
pute, forensic analysts found what appeared to be backdat-
ing of a document that was pertinent to the case. Further
analysis found that the discrepancy between the created
date embedded within the document compared with the cre-
ated date on the file system was due to file tunnelling
resulting from normal use of Microsoft Word. Controlled
experiments using Microsoft Word revealed that the file
tunnelling phenomenon occurs when the ‘Save As’ menu
item is selected to resave a file using the same name, effec-
tively overwriting the file with the newest version of itself.
Before the ‘Save As’ occurs, the created date embedded
within the file matches the created date on the file system.
After the file is modified and saved with the same name
using the ‘Save As’ function, the embedded created date is
updated but the created date on the file system remains
unchanged due to file tunnelling. Table 1 compares the
properties of the Word document before and after this Save
As operation is performed, including the distinctive trace of
the Revision number being set to 2.
File tunneling has also been observed in the context of Inter-
net activities, with the contents of files being updated while
retaining the old file system metadata. Without knowledge of file
tunneling, temporal discrepancies between the file system meta-
data and dates in the cluster contents can lead to incorrect con-
clusions about digital stratigraphy.
Discussion
This work demonstrates the applicability of studying digital
strata on storage media in forensic analysis to uncover the time
frame, origin, composition, and distribution of each stratum.
These novel approaches to conducting contextual analysis of file
allocation traces, collectively called digital stratigraphy, translate
concepts from stratigraphy in geology and archeology into the
digital realm.
Among other insights, forensic practitioners and researchers
can employ digital stratigraphy to discern concealment and
destruction activities through a deeper understanding of file
system behavior and the contextual analysis of file systems.
When next-available file allocation strategies are exhibited, the
FIG. 11––The same partially initialized file as Fig. 10, but viewed using Autopsy version 4.1.1. Zeroes are displayed instead of the actual cluster contents.
The Autopsy graphical user interface (GUI) hides slack space by default to emulate what the Windows operating system presents. Autopsy version 4.3 and
above have added an option to unhide data in slack space, presenting it as a separate file in the GUI. [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
TABLE 1––Properties of an MS Word (Office version on Windows 8) docu-
ment that has been resaved using the same name, effectively overwriting
itself. File tunneling causes the new file to retain the old created date on the
file system.
Property Name Before Save As After Save As
File system created date 02/25/2015 02/25/2015
File system modified date 02/25/2015 6/5/2017
Embedded created date 02/25/2015 6/5/2017
Revision number 6 2
Editing time 5 min 0
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resulting traces can be utilized to infer their meaning and sig-
nificance. However, when performing digital stratigraphy anal-
ysis, forensic practitioners must be aware that some traces of
file allocation will not follow next-available allocation strate-
gies. Furthermore, forensic practitioners must remember that
apparent temporal discrepancies can be caused by normal file
system behavior such as file initialization and file tunneling.
Digital stratigraphy can reveal traces of deletion when only
metadata is recoverable or when no metadata for the deleted file
content is recoverable. In addition, digital stratigraphy can
uncover deleted data buried within a file system, such as in
VDL slack. Digital stratigraphy can also be applied to recycled
flash memory chips to differentiate activities of the current user
from those of prior uses of the chip in previous, recycled devices
(19).
There is a need for forensic tools to provide necessary
information for contextual analysis, such as highlighting mass
deletion, mass copying, VDL slack stratigraphy, file tunneling,
and potential backdating. For example, in addition to plotting
location information together with temporal details as shown
in the present work, the Harris matrix approach could be
adapted to digital stratigraphy (1). As another example, a
proof of concept visualization tool developed to examine
changes of file state (active vs. deleted) over time using infor-
mation in Shadow Volumes demonstrates a form of digital
stratigraphy that could be adapted to other file system meta-
data (20).
Other file systems need to be studied from a digital stratigra-
phy perspective, including exFAT, EXT4, and APFS. Further
research is needed to develop novel digital stratigraphy methods
that utilize the position of data on disk (e.g., scattered vs. con-
centrated), the origin of various fragments (e.g., from one source
vs. many sources), or the composition of the data. New digital
stratigraphy methods can be explored by performing controlled
experiments to observe the file allocation traces that are created
by specific actions.
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